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Something material has happened since this was last valued, 2 weeks ago. The number below still stands on the last filed facts; it sorts below unflagged companies on the screen until the next filing, or until somebody confirms the thesis holds.
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Explore the research to see how business evidence informs assumptions and valuation.
Start with the business evidence, then follow the assumptions through to scenarios and valuation.
Valuation and assumptionsWritten at USD 938.2100; now USD 975.26000000 (+4%). Upside to the weighted case has moved from -45% to -47%.
Micron is a well-managed commodity cyclical at a record cycle peak, whose economics are primarily driven by DRAM and NAND contract pricing, the timing of industry capacity additions, and the duration of the current AI-driven shortage. Its principal competitive advantage is a narrow one - node leadership and HBM qualification within a three-player oligopoly controlling over 90% of DRAM, now supplemented by roughly $100bn of take-or-pay contracted minimum revenue backed by $18bn of customer cash deposits - while its most important vulnerabilities are a fixed cost structure that converts a 20% price decline into a 40-point gross margin swing, a fiscal 2027 capital budget above $45bn deployed at the top of the cycle, and management's own disclosure that blended DRAM cost per bit will now rise. Under the base case, three more years of near-peak earnings followed by normalisation to $160bn of revenue at a 28% operating margin and $34bn of sustainable free cash flow imply intrinsic value of approximately $390 per share versus a market price of $938.21. The investment therefore depends primarily on whether AI has permanently reset memory bit demand above the industry's ability to supply it - a proposition supported by all three suppliers' own commentary and contradicted by fifty years of industry history, and one that the capacity being funded today will test in 2029. The most important evidence to monitor is DRAM contract pricing, non-GAAP gross margin against the ~86% guide, days of inventory, combined industry capital expenditure, and the price at which management repurchases stock once CHIPS Act restrictions lapse in December 2026.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Company | Micron Technology, Inc. |
| Ticker / exchange | MU / NASDAQ |
| Current share price | $938.21 (close, 2026-09-01) [S11][S12] |
| Market capitalization | ~$1.054 trillion [S12] |
| Enterprise value | ~$1.030 trillion [Est., net cash $24.4bn] [S5] |
| Industry | Semiconductor memory (DRAM, NAND, HBM) |
| Primary geographies | US, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia; sales concentrated in US and Asia |
| Investment classification | Cyclical |
| Business quality | Medium |
| Competitive advantage | Moderate |
| Financial quality | Strong |
| Growth outlook | Strong (near-term), Weak (normalized) |
| Balance-sheet risk | Low |
| Valuation attractiveness | Unattractive |
| Overall risk | High |
| Base-case intrinsic value | $390 |
| Bull-case intrinsic value | $1,150 |
| Bear-case intrinsic value | $210 |
| Probability-weighted value | $517 [Est.] |
| Upside/downside vs price | −44.9% |
| Expected annualized return, base case (3–5yr) | −12% to −5% [Est.] |
| Investment stance | Avoid |
This is a contrarian conclusion and I want to flag it immediately. Sell-side coverage is 44 buys and zero sells, with an average twelve-month target of $1,513 [S11]. My base case sits at $390, near the lowest published target of $361 [S11]. Anyone using this report should read §28, where I name the assumption I am least able to defend, before acting on the stance.
Why it may look attractive. Micron trades at roughly 6.5× forward earnings [S12] having just reported a quarter with 84.9% non-GAAP gross margin, $18.3bn of free cash flow, and revenue up 346% year-over-year [S5][S10]. It has $24.4bn of net cash, a BBB+ upgrade, and $100bn of contracted minimum revenue under take-or-pay agreements [S5][S3]. On every trailing and forward multiple it screens as one of the cheapest large-caps in the market.
What the market may be misunderstanding — or what I may be. A 6.5× forward multiple on a memory company is not a valuation signal, it is a statement that the market also believes these earnings are unsustainable. The disagreement between me and the consensus is not about whether FY2027 earnings are peak earnings. It is about what the business earns in FY2030 and beyond, after roughly $180bn of Micron capex and several hundred billion of industry capex has landed. My reverse-DCF (§22) says the current price requires roughly $100–135bn of sustainable annual free cash flow in perpetuity — more than Apple generates. Micron's entire revenue in fiscal 2024 was about $25bn.
The most important value driver. Not HBM share, not node leadership, not the SCAs. It is the duration of the shortage — how many years of peak earnings occur before industry capacity catches demand. Each additional year of peak is worth roughly $65 per share [Est., §17]; the terminal assumption is worth several hundred.
The largest risk to the bull case. The industry is doing exactly what it has always done at the top: Micron raised fiscal 2026 capex to ~$27bn and guided fiscal 2027 quarterly capex above the Q4 run rate of $10bn [S5], implying $45bn+; Samsung and SK hynix are planning a combined investment exceeding $500bn in a new Korean hub [S17]. SK hynix's own registration statement warns that (cite index="125-1">capital investments and new technologies may increase memory supply not matched by commensurate demand growth, and the industry has experienced significant and sometimes prolonged periods of oversupply and weak prices [S13]. The competitor's own risk factor is the bear case, stated by the competitor.
What must be true for the investment to work. That AI has permanently reset the demand curve for memory bits at a level that absorbs the 2027–2029 capacity wave without a price break, and that the strategic customer agreement structure converts half of Micron's revenue from spot-priced commodity to contracted infrastructure supply with floors above prior-peak margins. Both are plausible. Neither has been tested through a down-cycle, because there has not been one since the structure existed.
I want to defend this against a stock that just earned an 85% gross margin.
Micron's cost per bit depends on node leadership, and it currently has it. But process leadership in memory is a rotating advantage — Samsung, SK hynix and Micron have traded it repeatedly over thirty years — and it delivers a cost advantage of a few percentage points, not a structural pricing power. Management has itself signalled that blended DRAM cost per bit will rise from current levels [S1], which erodes the historical basis of the cost-leadership argument for everyone.
HBM is designed into a specific accelerator generation, qualified over months, and cannot be swapped mid-cycle. That creates real switching cost for the duration of a product generation — roughly 18–24 months. It is a moat with an expiry date that resets at every generation, and Micron is the #2 or #3 qualified supplier, not the leader [S9].
$100bn of RPO at floors clearing prior-peak margins [S3][S10], with $18bn of customer cash deposits [S4], is genuinely valuable and genuinely new. But note what it is: a contract, not a barrier. SK hynix and Samsung are signing comparable agreements; customers are (cite index="124-1">already reserving supply years ahead across all suppliers [S14]. An advantage every competitor also has is an industry condition, not a moat. Its value to Micron is downside protection, which I credit heavily in the bear case, not pricing power.
There is no brand premium in DRAM. No network effects. No ecosystem. Patent cross-licensing is universal in memory. Outside HBM qualification, a customer switches supplier by placing the next order elsewhere.
US domicile, CHIPS support, and the New York fab cluster confer real policy advantage in a world of memory export controls and supply-chain nationalism. This is a larger factor than it was five years ago. It also comes with strings: CHIPS Act restrictions have constrained Micron's buyback capacity until December 9, 2026 [S16-adjacent, corroborated by management commentary].
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Sustained ROIC above WACC | No, historically. Micron destroyed capital across the 2015–2024 cycle in aggregate [Unverified]. Spectacularly above WACC today. |
| Stable/rising market share | Roughly stable at ~20–23% DRAM for a decade |
| Pricing power | Present today; absent through history. This is shortage, not power. |
| Gross margin | 84.9% today [S10]; negative in fiscal 2023 |
| Customer retention | High but not contractual outside SCAs |
| Incremental margin | Extraordinary today — the mechanical result of fixed costs and rising price |
The row that matters is the first. A business whose defining historical characteristic is failing to earn its cost of capital across a full cycle does not have a wide moat, however good the current quarter looks. Narrow is the right rating, and the SCAs plus HBM qualification are what lift it from None.
| Risk | Type | Prob. | Financial impact | Horizon | Leading indicator | Mitigation | Priced in? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cyclical price reversal as 2027–29 capacity lands | Business | 60% | −$400 to −$700/share | 2–4yr | Gross margin; days of inventory; industry capex | SCA floors on 20–50% of volume | Partially — the 6.5× forward multiple says the market expects a peak, but not a break of this magnitude |
| Hyperscaler AI capex pause | Business | 30% | −$300 to −$500/share | 1–3yr | Big-tech capex guidance | SCA take-or-pay; $18bn deposits | Partially |
| Depreciation from FY26–28 capex crushes trough margins | Business | 70% | −$100 to −$200/share | 3–5yr | D&A as % of revenue | None — it is contractual | No |
| Buybacks executed above intrinsic value | Capital allocation | 55% | −$40 to −$60/share | 1–3yr | Repurchase disclosure post-Dec 2026 | Management discretion | No |
| CXMT / Chinese subsidised supply | Business | 45% | −$40 to −$80/share | 3–7yr | CXMT capacity and qualification reports | Technology lead; export controls | Partially |
| HBM share loss to SK hynix or Samsung | Business | 30% | −$35 to −$70/share | 1–3yr | HBM revenue; design wins | HBM4 ramping 2× faster [S5] | No |
| Customer deposit repayment coincides with downturn | Financial | 25% | Liquidity pressure, not solvency | 3–5yr | Deposit schedule in 10-K | $24.4bn net cash; BBB+ | No |
| Multiple compression as the cycle turns | Valuation | 65% | −$200/share | 1–3yr | Peer multiples | None | Partially |
| Taiwan disruption | Geopolitical | 10% | Ambiguous sign; very large magnitude | Any | Cross-strait tension | Geographic diversification | No |
| Architectural change reducing memory intensity per FLOP | Technology | 15% | −$200/share | 4–8yr | Accelerator roadmaps | None | No |
| Balance-sheet distress | Financial | <3% | Immaterial | — | Net cash | $24.4bn net cash, BBB+ | Yes |
Distinguishing the three risk types matters unusually much here. Business risk is high. Financial risk is close to nil. Valuation risk is the dominant one, and it is the one an investor actually bears at $938.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-free rate | 4.3% | [Unverified — could not confirm the current 10yr Treasury yield] |
| Beta used | 1.60 | [Est.] — Micron's reported trailing beta is 2.22 [S12], but that is measured over a period containing a 745% move and overstates forward systematic risk. Using 2.22 would imply a 15.4% cost of equity and cut the base case to roughly $310. |
| Equity risk premium | 5.0% | [Est.] |
| Cost of equity | 12.3% | Derived |
| Cost of debt (pre-tax) | 5.0% | BBB+ [S5] |
| Tax rate | 15% | Management guided ~15% for fiscal Q4 [S5] |
| After-tax cost of debt | 4.25% | Derived |
| Debt weight | ~0.5% | $5.7bn debt against a $1.05tn cap [S5][S12] |
| WACC | 12.5% | Derived, rounded up for cyclicality |
| Terminal growth | 3.0% | Nominal GDP; memory bit demand grows faster but price per bit falls |
| Diluted share count | 1.15bn | Management's fiscal Q4 guidance figure [S5]; 1.13bn basic [S12] |
| Share count assumption | Roughly flat — buybacks offset over the period, and I do not credit buybacks with adding per-share value at prices above intrinsic value | Deliberate |
| Stock-based compensation | Treated as an expense and embedded in the operating margin assumptions | Immaterial at this revenue scale |
| Customer deposits | Excluded from free cash flow and from net cash — they are a repayable liability, not equity | Deliberate; matches management's own treatment [S4] |
| Net cash | $24.4bn [S5] | Read |
Two treatment choices worth flagging for anyone comparing valuations:
Beta. Using the reported 2.22 rather than my 1.60 moves the base case from $390 to roughly $310. Two Micron valuations can differ by 20% on this input alone.
Customer deposits. Adding the $18bn of deposits [S4] to net cash would raise the valuation by about $16/share. I exclude them because they must be returned [S3]. A valuation that counts them as permanent capital is making an error, not a judgement.
I lead with this rather than DCF because for a commodity cyclical at a record peak, the DCF's answer is entirely a restatement of the terminal assumption, and it is more honest to state the terminal directly.
| Fiscal 2026E (peak) | My normalized estimate | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ~$129bn | $150–180bn |
| Operating margin | ~65% | 22–30% |
| Net income | ~$83bn | $28–45bn |
| EPS (1.15bn shares) | ~$73.7 | $24–39 |
| Capex | $27bn | $35–42bn |
| Free cash flow | ~$45bn+ | $25–40bn |
At a 12–14× multiple on normalized EPS — appropriate for a capital-intensive cyclical with a narrow moat and a genuinely improved industry structure — normalized value is $290–545 per share, plus roughly $21/share of net cash. Midpoint: approximately $430.
That range does not include the value of the intervening harvest, which is substantial and which the DCF below captures.
All figures USD billions, fiscal years. Base case: the shortage persists through fiscal 2029, then normalises over fiscal 2030–31.
| Year | Revenue | Op. margin | Net income | Capex | FCF | PV @12.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2027E | 205 | 62% | 118 | 46 | 80 | 71.1 |
| FY2028E | 215 | 58% | 115 | 52 | 70 | 55.3 |
| FY2029E | 200 | 47% | 90 | 50 | 48 | 33.7 |
| FY2030E | 170 | 34% | 55 | 42 | 22 | 13.7 |
| FY2031E | 160 | 28% | 45 | 38 | 18 | 10.0 |
Blending the normalized-earnings method ($430) and the DCF ($354), I set the base case at $390.
Terminal value is 52% of the DCF total — lower than in a typical growth-company DCF, because the harvest is so large. That is the one structurally reassuring feature of this valuation: a meaningful share of the value arrives in the next three years and does not depend on the terminal.
| Multiple | Micron @ $938.21 | Own history [Unverified] | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E (TTM) | 21.1× [S12] | 8–40× (and negative) | On trough-to-peak trailing earnings |
| P/E on FY2026E EPS ~$73.7 | 12.7× [Est.] | — | On peak earnings |
| Forward P/E (NTM) | 6.48× [S12] | 4–12× at peaks | The headline "cheap" number |
| P/E on normalized EPS ~$31 | 30.3× [Est.] | 12–18× mid-cycle | The number that matters |
| EV/EBITDA (TTM) | ~15.1× [Est., EBITDA $68.3bn] [S12] | 3–10× | |
| EV/Sales on FY2026E | ~8.0× | 1.5–4× | Well above any historical range |
| Price/FCF on FY2026E | ~23× | — | |
| Dividend yield | 0.06% [S12] | — | Immaterial |
Read the third and fourth rows together. Micron at 6.5× forward earnings is the cheapest-looking large-cap in the market. Micron at 30× normalized earnings is one of the more expensive industrials. Both are true, and which one is right is the entire question.
The 6.5× forward multiple is not evidence that the stock is cheap. It is evidence that the market agrees these earnings are not sustainable — a market genuinely expecting $145 of perpetual EPS would not pay 6.5×, it would pay 20×. The low multiple is the market's own bear case, expressed in price. My disagreement with the consensus is narrower than the stance suggests: we agree the earnings are peak; we disagree about how far they fall and for how long they stay high first.
Should Micron trade at a premium or discount to its history? A premium is defensible: the industry is more concentrated, HBM is a genuinely better product category than commodity DRAM, and the SCA structure is real. Roughly 12–14× normalized earnings against a historical 10–14× seems right. It is not defensible at 30×.
Replacement value. Micron's fabs and equipment, at today's construction costs of roughly $20bn+ for a leading-edge memory fab, would cost perhaps $180–250bn to rebuild [Est., very rough]. Add process IP and HBM qualification. This gives a rough asset floor somewhere around $180–250/share — usefully close to my bear case, and a reminder that the downside is bounded by something real.
Earnings power value (normalized net income of $36bn capitalised at 12.5%, no growth): $288bn = $250/share, plus net cash.
Sum-of-the-parts — not meaningful; DRAM and NAND share fabs, R&D and customers.
What goes wrong: The 2028–2029 capacity wave lands. Micron's $72bn of fiscal 2026–27 capex, Samsung and SK hynix's $500bn Korean hub [S17], and CXMT's subsidised expansion all produce simultaneously, into an AI capex digestion phase. Contract prices break in calendar 2028. Depreciation on the new asset base is several times historical levels, so trough margins are worse than 2023's despite higher revenue. Micron has spent $80–120bn on buybacks near record prices. SCA floors cushion 20–35% of volume but the uncontracted majority reprices to cash cost.
Most likely trajectory: The shortage persists through fiscal 2028 and moderates through fiscal 2029, consistent with management's "tight beyond calendar 2027" [S10] but not with SK hynix's "well into the next decade." Micron harvests approximately $240bn of free cash flow across fiscal 2027–31. SCA coverage reaches 40–50% of revenue, meaningfully raising the trough. Capacity lands in fiscal 2029–30 and prices normalise without collapsing. Micron settles as a structurally larger business — $160bn of revenue, 28% operating margin, $45bn of net income — but one that must reinvest $38bn a year to stay there.
What must go right: AI has permanently reset the memory demand curve. SK hynix's CEO is right that demand exceeds supply well into the next decade [S16]. Fab construction, skilled-labour shortages and permitting genuinely cap industry bit growth below demand growth for five or more years [S10]. SCA coverage exceeds 50% of revenue with floors above prior-peak margins [S5][S10], and the structure survives a demand wobble intact — at which point the market re-rates Micron from commodity cyclical to contracted infrastructure supplier, and the discount rate compresses toward 9%. HBM4E customisation [S8] gives Micron durable, non-commoditisable product economics. Content-per-device growth compounds independently of AI capex.
| Scenario | Value | Probability | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $210 | 0.35 | $73.50 |
| Base | $390 | 0.40 | $156.00 |
| Bull | $1,150 | 0.25 | $287.50 |
| Total | 1.00 | $517.00 |
Versus $938.21: −44.9%.
The shape of this distribution is the most important thing in the report. The bull case is 2.9× the base case; the bear is 0.54×. A 5.5-fold spread between bear and bull is not a failure to do the work — it is the correct representation of a commodity cyclical at a record peak where the central question is unanswerable in advance. Note also that the bull case contributes 56% of the weighted value from only 25% probability. If you believe the bull case is 40% likely rather than 25%, the weighted value rises to about $690 and the stance moves to Hold. That single probability judgement, not any modelling, determines the answer.
Currently earning an 85% gross margin; lost money three years ago. Extreme capital intensity, no recurring revenue, no switching cost outside HBM qualification, and management's own disclosure that cost per bit will now rise [S1]. The three-player structure, HBM and the SCAs lift this from 3 to 5.
Real node leadership and a fast-closing HBM position [S5], but rotating rather than durable, and no evidence of ROIC above WACC across a full cycle. Narrow moat.
Excellent operators. Node and HBM4 execution is genuinely impressive, the balance sheet was strengthened rather than levered at the peak [S5], and the SCA structure is the best decision available to a memory CEO in this position. Marked down for $45bn+ of fiscal 2027 capex at the cycle top and for an untested capital-return policy that could destroy substantial value if executed as buybacks at current prices.
$24.4bn net cash, $5.7bn total debt, BBB+ upgrade, $18bn of customer deposits incoming, and a fiscal Q4 free cash flow guide above $30bn [S5][S11]. A fortress. This thesis will not fail through the balance sheet.
Explosive near-term and genuinely constrained long-term — the growth itself invites the supply that ends it. Content-per-device growth is a real, underrated structural positive.
6.5× forward earnings and roughly 30× normalized earnings. The first number is the trap; the second is the assessment.
Bear −78%, base −58%, bull +23%. A bull case that pays roughly the cost of equity against a bear case that loses three quarters of capital is poor asymmetry at this price.
1. Is this a good business? A well-run company in a difficult industry. Memory has destroyed capital across most complete cycles, and Micron's own fiscal 2023 loss and fiscal 2024 near-zero ROIC are three years old. The current quarter is not evidence about the business; it is evidence about the cycle.
2. Stronger or weaker? Genuinely stronger, and I want to be clear about that. The balance sheet, the SCA book, HBM4 execution and US policy positioning all represent real, durable improvement. The business Micron will be at the next trough is better than the one it was at the last. That does not make the equity attractive at 30× normalized earnings.
3. Durable competitive advantage? Narrow. HBM qualification is real but resets each generation. Node leadership rotates. The SCAs are contracts every competitor is also signing.
4. Three most important value drivers? (i) DRAM contract price direction; (ii) industry capex and therefore the timing of the supply wave; (iii) terminal normalized operating margin.
5. Three largest risks? (i) The cyclical price reversal as 2027–29 capacity lands; (ii) depreciation from today's capex crushing trough margins; (iii) buybacks executed above intrinsic value during the harvest.
6. Most important dependency? Hyperscaler and accelerator-vendor capital spending. It is functionally the entire demand function, and it is concentrated in a handful of buyers.
7. What is the market pricing in? Roughly five to six more years of near-peak earnings and a terminal business generating something in the region of $110–145bn of annual free cash flow — against Micron's entire fiscal 2024 revenue of about $25bn.
8. Where could the market be wrong? On the durability of the terminal, and on treating a 6.5× forward multiple as evidence of cheapness when it is evidence the market shares the concern. Also on the unremarked disclosure that blended DRAM cost per bit will now rise [S1].
9. Fair intrinsic value? $390 base case; $517 probability-weighted; an honest range of $210–$1,150. That range is five-fold, and stating a narrower one would be false precision.
10. Margin of safety today? Deeply negative. Price is 141% above the base case and 81% above the weighted value.
11. Reasonable annualized return over 3–5 years? −8.6% probability-weighted. Bear −24%, base −10%, bull +11%.
12. Single development that would most strengthen the thesis? Gross margin falling below 70% for two consecutive quarters while capex guidance stays above $45bn — the classic signature of a memory peak rolling over into a funded supply wave.
13. Single development that would most invalidate it? SCA coverage exceeding 50% of revenue and holding contracted pricing intact through a period of falling spot prices. That would demonstrate the de-cyclicalisation is real and would justify a re-rating I have not given.
14. At what price does it become clearly attractive? $350 — below my base case, roughly at replacement value, and a level at which even the bear case does not lose much. Note the implication: I would not buy Micron until it has fallen roughly 63%, which is a normal drawdown for this stock (the 52-week low is $114.25 [S12]).
15. What price implies excessive optimism? $1,150 — the bull case, and near the June 2026 all-time closing high of $1,213 [S18]. The stock has already been there.
Micron is a well-managed commodity cyclical at a record cycle peak, whose economics are primarily driven by DRAM and NAND contract pricing, the timing of industry capacity additions, and the duration of the current AI-driven shortage. Its principal competitive advantage is a narrow one — node leadership and HBM qualification within a three-player oligopoly controlling over 90% of DRAM, now supplemented by roughly $100bn of take-or-pay contracted minimum revenue backed by $18bn of customer cash deposits — while its most important vulnerabilities are a fixed cost structure that converts a 20% price decline into a 40-point gross margin swing, a fiscal 2027 capital budget above $45bn deployed at the top of the cycle, and management's own disclosure that blended DRAM cost per bit will now rise. Under the base case, three more years of near-peak earnings followed by normalisation to $160bn of revenue at a 28% operating margin and $34bn of sustainable free cash flow imply intrinsic value of approximately $390 per share versus a market price of $938.21. The investment therefore depends primarily on whether AI has permanently reset memory bit demand above the industry's ability to supply it — a proposition supported by all three suppliers' own commentary and contradicted by fifty years of industry history, and one that the capacity being funded today will test in 2029. The most important evidence to monitor is DRAM contract pricing, non-GAAP gross margin against the ~86% guide, days of inventory, combined industry capital expenditure, and the price at which management repurchases stock once CHIPS Act restrictions lapse in December 2026.
Most of the above will be readable in the fiscal 2026 Form 10-K, filed after the September 30, 2026 results. This report should be re-run against that filing, which will also contain the first full RPO disclosure of approximately $100bn [S10].
The terminal normalized earnings power is the weakest link and carries the entire conclusion; it is unknowable before roughly 2029, and shifting the bull-case probability from 25% to 40% would move the weighted value to about $690 and the stance to hold. Also unresolved: days of inventory for FQ3 2026, the highest-signal early-warning metric in memory; customer concentration, implied high by the SCA structure but not disclosed; the repayment schedule for the $18bn of customer deposits, described only as weighted to the back half; full fiscal 2026 results, since FQ4 revenue of $50bn is guidance not fact; historical financials before fiscal 2026, reconstructed from press and trailing-twelve-month data rather than read from filings; stock-based compensation, debt maturity schedule, segment detail and geographic revenue mix; executive compensation structure; competitor financials on a comparable basis apart from SK hynix's registration statement; and whether capital returns after December 9, 2026 will take the form of buybacks or dividends, which materially affects realised shareholder returns. Most are readable in the fiscal 2026 Form 10-K, filed after the September 30, 2026 results.
These model scenarios depend on their inputs. Review the assumptions and supporting evidence alongside the implied values.
earnings multiple v2 · as of 2026-09-12
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